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WATER AS A PUBLIC COMMODITY
BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR.

*

I. INTRODUCTION
Three themes have dominated the principal debates over water law
and policy during the last quarter century. The first theme is water as a
public trust, with title to water resources held by the state as custodian
for the public as a whole and with an obligation to manage water on a
1
holistic basis to maximize overall societal benefit. While the public
trust doctrine historically emphasized the importance of waterways for
navigation and commerce, it recently has focused on the need for
sustainable environmental protection for current and future
2
generations. The second theme is water as an economic commodity, to
3
be priced, traded, and managed by the private sector. The final vision is
water as a global human right, under which all people have access to

* Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law, Stanford Law School; Perry
L. McCarty Director, Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University; Senior
Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies, Stanford University. Particular
thanks are due to Professor Richard Howitt of the University of California at Davis for first
suggesting the term “public commodity” to describe the emerging vision for water
management. Our book on California water policy incorporates the term. ELLEN HANAK,
JAY LUND, ARIEL DINAR, BRIAN GRAY, RICHARD HOWITT, JEFFREY MOUNT, PETER
MOYLE & BARTON “BUZZ” THOMPSON, MANAGING CALIFORNIA’S WATER: FROM
CONFLICT TO RECONCILIATION 315–48 (2011). I am also grateful for comments and
suggestions received at the symposium on “Changing Conceptions of Water in the Law” at
the annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools in January 2011 and from
members of the Workshop on Development and the Environment at the University of
California at Berkeley School of Law. Finally, I am indebted to Josh Patashnik (Stanford
Law School ’11) for invaluable research assistance.
1. For the classic article on the public trust doctrine, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471
(1970).
2. Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging
Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 393–96, 402–09 (1991); see also
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (concluding that the “public uses” which the
trust protects “are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs,” including
ecological preservation).
3. See, e.g., Jennifer Davis, Private-Sector Participation in the Water and Sanitation
Sector, 30 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 145, 153–56 (2005) (detailing the privatization of
water supply and sanitation services in both developing and industrial nations).

THOMPSON-13.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

18

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

11/21/2011 11:00 AM

[95:17

clean and adequate water resources for basic personal and domestic
4
needs.
All three themes have gained ascendancy in recent years, despite
claimed and perceived inconsistencies.
According to many
commentators, treating water as a commodity is incompatible with
5
managing water as either a public trust or a human right. Full-cost
pricing of water, allocation of water to the highest bidder, and privatesector involvement in water management are all, from the perspective of
these commentators, inconsistent with the view that water is a unique
public resource that should be managed to promote the broad public
interest (particularly with regards to the environment and the rights of
6
the poorest members of society). Given this claimed inconsistency, the
simultaneous rise of all three themes would seem incoherent and
surprising.
In fact, all three themes are potentially harmonious, although there
inherently will be tensions. Indeed, any one theme by itself will result in
either an impoverished or ineffective water vision. Water policies that
fail to protect the environment are unlikely, certainly in the long run
and potentially even in the short run, to fulfill human needs not only for
basic domestic needs, but also for food security and economic
development. And economic tools such as pricing, markets, and
privatization can be important and even essential means of meeting both
human and environmental needs, as well as maximizing the economic
benefits to be derived from water resources. Only a combination of the
three ascendant themes can provide a holistic and workable vision for
water management.
When combined, the three themes suggest an alternative vision of
water as a public commodity. This vision recognizes that the public has
a critical interest in water. Water is unique among all resources. Water
4. For general analyses of water as a human right, see Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications
of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 967–77 (2004); Peter H.
Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL’Y 487 (1999).
5. For criticisms of the view that water should be treated as a commodity, see MAUDE
BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT: THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND THE COMING BATTLE FOR
THE RIGHT TO WATER 58–62, 91–101 (2007); VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS:
PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION, AND PROFIT 15, 27–28, 34–36 (2002); Williamson B.C. Chang,
Water: Consumer Commodity or Government Subsidy?, in WATER VALUES AND MARKETS:
EMERGING MANAGEMENT TOOLS 18, 18–20 (Linda Schroeder ed., 1986); Eric T. Freyfogle,
Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27, 35–37 (1996).
6. See BARLOW, supra note 5, at 58–62, 91–97; SHIVA, supra note 5, at 27, 34–36; Chang,
supra note 5, at 18–20; Freyfogle, supra note 5, at 35.
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is essential not only to life, but to virtually any human endeavor and
thus the betterment of society. Water is an irreplaceable element of
most healthy, functioning ecosystems—and thus the production of
ecosystem services is of importance to people. Water also is intrinsic to
most religions and cultural systems. For all these reasons, water is
inherently public, and governments have a continuing obligation to
ensure its effective management for overall societal well-being,
including both environmental protection and essential human
consumptive needs. However, commodifying water can actually help
promote these goals. Pricing, markets, and even the participation of
private entities have helped ensure that water is not wasted and, when
properly directed and regulated, can help promote the environment and
increase drinking-water access. Treating water as public but not as a
commodity will fail to maximize societal benefits, while treating water as
a commodity but not as public will fail to ensure that water meets all
public needs.
Part II of this Article sets out the three basic themes, their
importance to water policy, and their simultaneous rise over the last
several decades. Part III then considers potential inconsistencies
between the themes and examines, in particular, how the
commoditization of water has helped increase societal benefits from
scarce water resources and how it can help further maximize those
benefits in the future. Part IV briefly concludes by setting out a vision
of water as a public commodity.
II. THREE THEMES
An examination of international documents, statutes, and judicial
opinions displays a wide variety of themes that pervade the thinking and
analyses of policy makers and jurists. However, three themes in
particular have grown increasingly common in recent decades: the
public trust doctrine, water as a human right, and the roles of markets
and the private sector in managing water resources.
A. Water as a Public Trust
7

The oldest and most established theme is water as a public trust. As

7. See generally Sax, supra note 1. For articles examining the applicability of the public
trust doctrine to water resources, see Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and
the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701 (1995); Cynthia L. Koehler,
Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 22
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elaborated in the cases and laws cited and discussed below, the public
trust doctrine incorporates at least three important principles. First, the
government holds ultimate title to water on behalf of the public as a
whole. Although the government can grant individuals and private
entities limited rights to use water (as it does, for example, under both
the riparian and prior-appropriation systems), the government should
and does retain ultimate title and control over the water. Second, the
government holds title to water as a trustee for the public as a whole.
Water is not like other governmental property—such as post offices, city
halls, military bases, or even parks—over which the government holds
broad ownership rights and discretion. Instead, the government has a
responsibility to manage water for the interests of the public and, as a
result, holds more restricted ownership rights. Finally, irrespective of
what private rights the government has awarded in the past or what
actions individuals and private entities have taken in reliance on prior
policies, the government has both the authority and the obligation to
reallocate water and change management rules at any point in time in
response to changing conditions, information, or public norms because it
has a continuing obligation to manage water for public trust purposes.
During the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, the
public trust doctrine found voice primarily in decisions of U.S. courts
dealing with navigation rights and other non-consumptive uses of
8
navigable waterways.
Recent decades, however, have seen an
expansion of the public trust doctrine both substantively to
environmental and cultural interests in water and geographically to a
broader set of common law jurisdictions. In the United States, courts of
a number of states have explicitly held that the public trust doctrine
applies not only to waterways, but also to the waters of those
9
waterways. Furthermore, driven by evidence that extensive diversions
ECOLOGY L.Q. 541 (1995); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of
Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257 (1990); and The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resources Law and Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 181 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452–64 (1892); Arnold v. Mundy, 6
N.J.L. 1, 41 (1821).
9. The key precedent here is the California Supreme Court’s decision in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 728–32
(Cal. 1983). At least five other states have also held that the public trust doctrine applies to
water resources. See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409,
445, 453 (Haw. 2000); Idaho Conservation League v. State, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995);
Selkirk–Priest Basin Ass’n v. State, 899 P.2d 949, 953, 956 (Idaho 1995); Dep’t of State Lands
v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948, 957 (Mont. 1985); Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 608, 612–
14, 617 (Nev. 2011); United Plainsmen Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247
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of water from rivers and lakes are harming fish and threatening overall
aquatic ecosystems, several of these courts have used the public trust
10
doctrine to limit such diversions and increase environmental flows. For
example, in its 1984 Mono Lake decision, the California Supreme Court
concluded that the public trust doctrine requires the government to
11
manage water use where possible to protect the environment. And in a
subsequent decision, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the public
trust doctrine, as incorporated in Hawaii’s constitution, requires the
state not only to protect the environment, but also to manage surface
and groundwater on a sustainable basis for the benefit of both native
12
communities and future generations.
At the same time, a growing set of common law nations have
explicitly recognized the relevance and importance of the public trust
13
doctrine in water management. For example, in a 1997 case involving
the realignment of a river by a corporate interest, the Supreme Court of
India explicitly held that, as a vestige of its common law background, the
public trust doctrine applies to running waters and legally obligates the
14
government to protect aquatic environments. Subsequent decisions by
courts of both Sri Lanka and Kenya have followed suit in recognizing
that the government holds all the waters of the nation, as well as other
15
publicly important property, in trust for the public. South Africa has

N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976).
10. See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728–29, 732; Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 461.
11. 658 P.2d at 728.
12. Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 451, 453 & n.41 (citing HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 3).
13. For discussions of the public trust doctrine outside the United States, see Lucas
Bento, Searching for Intergenerational Green Solutions: The Relevance of the Public Trust
Doctrine to Environmental Preservation, 11 COMMON L. REV. 7, 12 (2009); Philippe Cullet,
Water Law in a Globalised World: The Need for a New Conceptual Framework, 23 J. ENVTL.
L. 233, 234–36, 242–43 (2011); Patricia Kameri-Mbote, The Use of the Public Trust Doctrine in
Environmental Law, 3/2 L. ENV’T & DEV. J. 195 (2007), available at http://www.leadjournal.org/content/07195.pdf; and David Takacs, Student Essay, The Public Trust Doctrine,
Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711,
712, 735–47 (2008).
14. M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1996) Supp. 10 S.C.R. 12, 45 (India) (“The State is the
trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment.”).
According to the India Supreme Court, running waters are natural resources to which the
public is a beneficiary. Id.
15. See Waweru v. The Republic, (2006) 1 K.L.R. 677, 692 (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (holding
that the government holds waterways “under a public trust to manage them in a way that
maintains a proper balance between the economic benefits of development with the needs of
a clean environment”); Bulankulama v. Sec’y, Ministry of Indus. Dev., 3 SRI L.R. 243, 253–54
(Sup. Ct. 2000) (Sri Lanka) (adopting concept of public guardianship).
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recognized the public trust doctrine by statute. Under South Africa’s
1998 National Water Act, the national government is the “public trustee
of the nation’s water resources” and must “ensure that water is
protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a
sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons and in
16
accordance with its constitutional mandate.”
Although the most explicit statement of the public trust doctrine is
found in cases of common law nations, the doctrine’s pedigree is not
purely common law. Most experts trace the doctrine’s lineage to the
Corpus Juris Civilis, commissioned by the Roman Emperor Justinian,
which stated that “running water,” along with such resources as air and
17
the sea, are “common to all” by the nature of the resources themselves.
Not surprisingly, the laws of a wide variety of jurisdictions, both civil
and common law, incorporate and reflect key elements of the public
trust doctrine. Governments almost universally hold title to their
nation’s water resources, and private rights in the water—where
18
recognized at all—are at the discretion of the government. Moreover,
most nations emphasize that the government holds the water as a
guardian for the people as a whole. For example, China’s constitution
provides that the state owns water, as well as a number of other natural
19
resources, on behalf of the “whole people,” and the French Water Act
20
of 1992 states that the use of water belongs to everyone. Increasingly,
national constitutions and laws emphasize the importance of managing
water for environmental sustainability, although such provisions are less

16. National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 3(1) (S. Afr.).
17. J. INST. 2.1.1 (J.B. Moyle trans., 1913). For discussions of the public trust doctrine’s
presumed Roman roots, see Bento, supra note 13, at 7; William Drayton, Jr., Note, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE
L.J. 762, 763–64 (1970); Kameri-Mbote, supra note 13, at 197–98; Takacs, supra note 13, at
711, 713.
18. There are exceptions, however. For example, the Chilean Constitution of 1980
provides that “[t]he rights of private citizens over waters, recognized or constituted in
conformity with the law, shall grant proprietorship to the owners thereof.” CONSTITUCIÓN
POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, § 24; see also Constitución Política de
los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P], as amended, art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.) (establishing the power in the government to transmit title
to water to private persons in the form of private property).
19. XIANFA. art. 9 (1982) (China).
20. Loi 92-3 du 3 janvier 1992 sur l’eau [Law 92-3 of January 3, 1992, On Water],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Jan. 4, 1992, p. 187.
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common and more hortatory than mandatory.

B. Water as a Commodity
Neoliberal ascendancy in law and policy during the second half of
the twentieth century also saw increased emphasis on the importance of
treating water as a commodity. Several factors beyond ideology,
however, have helped drive the commoditization of water. First,
growing water scarcity generated demands for greater water-use
efficiency through full-cost pricing and more rigorous management of
22
water systems. Second, continued urbanization increased interest in
reallocating water from agriculture to growing cities, for which markets
23
seemed the most politically palatable mechanism. Finally, the inability
of public water suppliers to provide access to ever increasing urban
populations in developing nations, and a need for greater levels of
investment in infrastructure throughout most of the world, created a
24
potential market for private water suppliers.
A variety of legal and policy documents over the last quarter century
have incorporated or reflected the vision of water as a commodity.
Most prominently, the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable
Development, which arose out of the International Conference on
Water and the Environment in Dublin, Ireland, in 1992, established as
one of its guiding principles that “[w]ater has an economic value in all its
25
competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.”
According to the Dublin Statement, “Past failure to recognize the
economic value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally
damaging uses of the resource [and m]anaging water as an economic
good is an important way of achieving efficient and equitable use, and of

21. At the most general level, almost 120 nations currently provide for environmental
protection in their constitutions. Takacs, supra note 13, at 726.
22. See, e.g., Peter Rogers et al., Water Is an Economic Good: How to Use Prices to
Promote Equity, Efficiency, and Sustainability, 4 WATER POL’Y 1, 1–4, 7–9 (2002).
23. See, e.g., ROBERT STAVINS, TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR WATER
37–38 (1983) (arguing for the use of water markets to meet the growing demands of Southern
California urban areas).
24. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 3, at 154–56 (noting that capital investment and the need
for more efficient service delivery has driven the interest in private firms).
25. Int’l Conference on Water and the Env’t, Dublin, Ir., Jan. 26–31, 1992, The Dublin
Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, princ. 4, U.N. Doc.
A/COMF.151/PC112 [hereinafter Dublin Statement], available at http://www.wmo.int/pages/pr
og/hwrp/documents/english/icwedece.html.
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encouraging conservation and protection of water resources.” Outside
the Dublin Statement, the vision of water as a commodity is found most
frequently in laws enabling or dictating particular market policies, such
27
as full-cost pricing or water markets, and in the guidance documents,
strategic plans, and loan conditions of international economic
organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
28
Fund.
1. Full-Cost Pricing of Water
The vision of water as a commodity incorporates at least three
separate but overlapping concepts. The first is water as a fully priced
resource. Most nations historically not only charged nothing for the
extraction of water from the environment, but also subsidized the
transportation, purification, and delivery of water, reflecting both a
desire to promote economic development for which water is an essential
29
input and to recognize water’s fundamental importance to all citizens.
Some water managers even denied that the normal rules of economics
applied to water: water demand, it was claimed, was highly elastic and
26. Id.
27. For discussions of the rise of water markets and supporting legal structures in the
western United States and elsewhere, see OLIVER M. BRANDES ET AL., CONFERENCE BD.
OF CAN., GOING WITH THE FLOW? EVOLVING WATER ALLOCATIONS AND THE POTENTIAL
AND LIMITS OF WATER MARKETS IN CANADA app. B, at 33–38 (2008); Jedidiah Brewer et
al., Law and the New Institutional Economics: Water Markets and Legal Change in California,
1987–2005, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 183, 186–95 (2008); Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 676, 701–03
(1993); R. Quentin Grafton et al., An Integrated Assessment of Water Markets: Australia,
Chile, China, South Africa and the USA 2–3, 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper
No. 16203, 2010).
28. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., WATER
RESOURCES SECTOR STRATEGY: STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR WORLD BANK
ENGAGEMENT 22–25 (2004) (describing a “principled pragmatism” approach toward water
pricing and water rights); KAREN BAKKER, PRIVATIZING WATER: GOVERNANCE FAILURE
AND THE WORLD’S URBAN WATER CRISIS 166–67 (2010) (discussing how the IMF in 1988
conditioned a loan to Bolivia on the privatization of water supply systems and other stateowned enterprises).
29. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX, ROBERT H. ABRAMS & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR.,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 689–90 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter LEGAL
CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES I]; Davis, supra note 3, at 165 (noting that for “largely
political reasons” publicly provided water has often been priced below cost); Duane Mecham
& Benjamin M. Simon, Forging a New Federal Reclamation Water Pricing Policy: Legal and
Policy Considerations, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 507, 509–10 (1995) (discussing pricing policies and
subsidies under the federal reclamation program); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Allocation
and Protection: A United States Case Study, in EARTH SYSTEMS: PROCESSES AND ISSUES 476,
482 (W.G. Ernst ed., 2000) [hereinafter Water Allocation].
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30

thus not influenced by price.
Increasing water scarcity, however, upended that view and replaced
it with the principle that water should be priced at or near its full cost in
order to avoid waste and, instead, encourage conservation—in short,
31
that water should be treated as an economic commodity. In the late
twentieth century, for example, Congress passed several laws in the
United States to reduce or eliminate the historical subsidization of
32
federal reclamation water for farmers in the West. In addition, an
increasing number of cities and nations have chosen to charge urban
residents the full cost of delivered water, although allocations of that
33
cost across classes of customers differ significantly among jurisdictions.
Both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund similarly
34
have called for full-cost pricing.
2. Water Markets
The vision of water as a commodity also incorporates water
marketing. Many jurisdictions, including in the western United States,
35
historically proscribed water marketing. Because water was a common
good rather than a commodity, profiting from the sale of water seemed
inequitable. If a water user no longer needed the water he or she was
using, others should have the right to use the water without having to
pay the original user. Water belonged to the public as a whole, not the
36
historical user.
Again, in response to water scarcity, a growing number of countries
and sub-national jurisdictions have begun not only to authorize water
30. LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES I, supra note 29, at 689.
31. See, e.g., Rogers et al., supra note 22, at 2 (noting that water usage is most valuable
when the price of water reflects its true cost); Water Allocation, supra note 29, at 482–83.
32. See, e.g., Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 3402,
3405, 106 Stat. 4600, 4706 (1992); Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293,
§§ 202, 205, 96 Stat. 1261, 1263–64, 1265–66 (1982). For a general overview of federal
reclamation pricing reforms, see JOSEPH L. SAX, BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D.
LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 771–96 (4th ed.
2006) [hereinafter LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II].
33. See, e.g., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES I, supra note 29, at 690
(discussing water pricing reform in cities of the western United States).
34. See generally K. William Easter & Yang Liu, Cost Recovery and Water Pricing for
Irrigation and Drainage Projects (The World Bank, Agric. and Rural Dev. Discussion Paper
No. 26, 2005).
35. LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra note 32, at 266–67.
36. Id. at 266–67 (citing and quoting ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 264,
365–67 (1903)).
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marketing and remove legal obstacles, but also to affirmatively promote
37
market transfers—adopting here too a vision of water as a commodity.
For example, in the United States, both the federal government and
western states have adopted procedures for reviewing and approving
water transfers, established water banks through which water can be
purchased and sold, authorized members of water districts to sell water
even over the opposition of the districts themselves, opened up
conveyance facilities for use by market participants, and enacted other
38
provisions designed to increase the number and size of transactions.
The western United States, moreover, has not been alone in promoting
water markets. Nations as diverse as Australia, Canada, Chile, China,
Mexico, and South Africa have authorized commercial water transfers
39
in at least some of their regions.
These legal changes have resulted in often robust water markets.
For example, in both Chile’s Limarí Valley and Australia’s MurrayDarling Basin, approximately one-third of all water entitlements change
40
hands each year. According to economic estimates, such markets also
involve sizable amounts of money and contribute significantly to the
local economy. Economists, for example, estimate that water markets in
the Limarí Valley contribute $22 million annually to the local economy
(ranging in any given year from 8% to 32% of the agricultural
contribution to local GDP) and that markets in the Murray-Darling
41
Basin contribute almost half a billion dollars in dry years.
Water
markets in the western United States have contributed anywhere from
approximately $1 million in Montana and Wyoming to as high as $223
42
million in California.
The movement toward water marketing is neither universal nor
37. See, e.g., Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 14–21 (noting the economic efficiency of
water markets).
38. For a general overview of these institutions and the law of water markets, see
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra note 32, at 264–98, 731–46, 778–79.
39. See, e.g., National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 6(1)(g) (S. Afr.); Water Act, R.S.A. 2000,
c. W-3, s. 5, 11 (Can. Alta.); Law No. 382 art. 7, Diciembre 30, 1988, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Chile); Law No. 1122, Agosto 13, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). See generally
Grafton et al., supra note 27 (discussing water markets in Australia, Chile, China, and South
Africa); Theodore M. Horbulyk & Lynda J. Lo, Welfare Gains from Potential Water Markets
in Alberta, Canada, in MARKETS FOR WATER: POTENTIAL AND PERFORMANCE 241 (K.
William Easter et al. eds., 1998); Wim H. Kloezen, Water Markets Between Mexican Water
User Associations, 1 WATER POL’Y 437 (1998).
40. Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 17.
41. Id. at 18.
42. Id.
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complete. Water marketing remains controversial.
Only a small
44
minority of nations have laws that encourage water transactions.
Moreover, even where the law permits water transfers, both institutional
impediments—e.g., lengthy and costly administrative review
procedures—and community opposition to trades have limited the
45
number and type of transactions. Most water trades are from farmer to
farmer within the same watershed; few agriculture-to-urban water
transfers, or inter-basin transfers, have occurred to date in most
46
jurisdictions.
And many water markets see only a handful of
transactions in any given year. For example, in the ten years that
Alberta, Canada, has authorized water transfers, only twenty-eight
transfers have occurred; only six transfers, representing just 0.05% of
47
the total water supply in the relevant basin, were permanent.
3. Private participation in water provision
A final component of the vision of water as a commodity is the role
of private companies in the supply of water to urban users. Private
companies have always played a role in water provision. In the United
States, private companies were early water suppliers to many major
48
cities, such as New York and San Francisco. In the late nineteenth and
43. For current critiques of water markets, see Chang, supra note 5, at 18–20; Freyfogle,
supra note 5, at 30–34; see also LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra note 32,
at 298–300 (identifying concerns of some legal scholars).
44. See Henning Bjornlund & Jennifer McKay, Aspects of Water Markets for Developing
Countries: Experiences for Australia, Chile, and the US, 7 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 769, 769–70
(2002) (noting that “[a]ctual experiences within water markets are still sparse,” and
identifying a few countries that maintain water markets).
45. For a general discussion of a number of the current obstacles to effective water
markets in the western United States, see LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra
note 32, at 264–98.
46. See, e.g., Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 21–22 (discussing the limited nature of
water transfers in Chile, the western United States, and South Africa).
47. BRANDES ET AL., supra note 27, app. B, at 32.
48. See, e.g., NELSON MANDFRED BLAKE, WATER FOR THE CITIES: A HISTORY OF THE
URBAN WATER SUPPLY PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 63–78 (1956); LEGAL CONTROL
OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra note 32, at 682 & n.2; ERWIN COOPER, AQUEDUCT
EMPIRE: A GUIDE TO WATER IN CALIFORNIA, ITS TURBULENT HISTORY AND ITS
MANAGEMENT TODAY 54 (1968) (noting how San Francisco turned to a private firm to
provide it with water); Jessica Budds & Gordon McGranahan, Are the Debates on Water
Privatization Missing the Point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America, 15 ENV’T
& URBANIZATION 87, 90 (2003); Davis, supra note 3, at 147 (noting that private firms, “often
with encouragement from local government, undertook a large share of the investment
required to construct the first water and sewer networks of major cities in the United States
and England”).
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early twentieth centuries, however, many cities replaced private supply
companies with municipal water agencies (although private companies
continue to supply approximately 15% of all domestic water in the
49
United States today). This evolution stemmed in large part from a
concern that water was too important to leave to private economic
actors; it was feared that private companies would not adequately
protect water quality or invest sufficiently in the extension and
50
Many other nations never had
maintenance of water systems.
significant private involvement in the water sector.
Disillusionment with varied public suppliers, however, has driven a
reevaluation of this perspective. Many public suppliers have proven
inefficient and incapable of meeting rising demands for both greater
access and higher quality water, and public suppliers have often not
generated the reserves needed to expand, modernize, or even maintain
51
In the face of these problems, international
water infrastructure.
financial institutions have pushed for varying degrees of privatization of
52
local water suppliers.
Partly as a result, a growing set of nations, including developing
nations such as Chile, Mexico, and Morocco, have passed laws
authorizing and facilitating privatization of water-supply systems. Some

49. LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra note 32, at 682; Budds &
McGranahan, supra note 48, at 91; Davis, supra note 3, at 147.
50. As one early 20th century commentator put it,
We have municipal ownership of our police and fire protection because we
know enough not to entrust the safety of ourselves and our family silver to seekers
after profit. . . .
Municipal ownership [should dominate] the water business primarily for the
same reason. We will entrust our light, heat and transportation, but not our life, to
the mercies of . . . money-making concern[s].
Evans Clark, Municipal Ownership in the United States, INTERCOLLEGIATE SOCIALIST, Oct.–
Nov. 1916, at 1, 8–9, reprinted in 4–5 LABOR AGE, 1915–1917 (1968); see also Budds &
McGranahan, supra note 48, at 90–91 (noting that governments decided that public supply
systems were “important for both public health and national economic development”).
51. For empirical evidence that “the public sector has been a costly and inefficient
provider of infrastructure,” see Davis, supra note 3, at 154 (citing and quoting Theodore
Panayotou, The Role of the Private Sector in Sustainable Infrastructure Development, in
BRIDGES TO SUSTAINABILITY: BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT WORKING TOGETHER FOR A
BETTER ENVIRONMENT 46, 46 (Yale Sch. of Forestry & Envtl. Stud., Bull. Ser. No. 101,
1997)); see also Budds & McGranahan, supra note 48, at 87 (“There is general agreement that
public utilities have been too slow in extending access to services and that they can be
inefficient and corrupt.”).
52. Bluemel, supra note 4, at 965; Budds & McGranahan, supra note 48, at 90–92.
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countries, such as Great Britain, have turned virtually all of their water53
supply systems over to the private sector. Encouraged to consider
privatization, a growing number of cities have engaged private
54
companies or examined the opportunity. By 2000, at least ninety-three
55
countries had privatized at least some aspects of their water supplies.
Indeed, the number of people served by private water suppliers
increased sixfold from 1990 to 2002, from approximately 50 million
56
people to over 300 million.
57
Like water marketing, water privatization remains controversial. In
the 1990s, some privatization efforts generated substantial public
opposition, in part because privatization was generally accompanied by
more universal collection of water bills and movement toward full-cost
58
pricing of water. In many of these cases, public officials ultimately
59
reversed the initial decision to privatize the municipal water supply.
Perhaps because of such opposition, privatization efforts appear to have
60
peaked in the 1990s. Where privatization has occurred, however, water
has begun to look more like other commodities, with private enterprise
playing a significant role in the production, transportation, purification,
and delivery of water supplies to domestic users.
While attracting most of the attention, large-scale privatization of
municipal suppliers remains only the tip of the iceberg that constitutes
53. See PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., PAC. INST., THE NEW ECONOMY OF WATER: THE
RISKS AND BENEFITS OF GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF FRESH WATER 24
(2002); Davis, supra note 3, at 153 (noting that private water companies serve all households
in England and Wales and 80% of French households).
54. See, e.g., SAX ET AL., supra note 32, at 716 (noting that almost a third of the largest
metropolitan governments in the United States were considering privatizing some or all of
their water system and infrastructure in the late 1990s).
55. Davis, supra note 3, at 153.
56. Id. Despite the increase in privatization, however, some estimates show that the
private sector still provides water to only about 5% of the world’s population. Budds &
McGranahan, supra note 48, at 88.
57. For discussions of the controversy from various perspectives, see Budds &
McGranahan, supra note 48; and Davis, supra note 3.
58. See Davis, supra note 3, at 165–69.
59. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, WATER PRIVATIZATION FIASCOS: BROKEN PROMISES AND
SOCIAL TURMOIL 3–7 (2003) (noting the situations in Atlanta, Manila, Cochabamba, and
Jakarta).
60. See Budds & McGranahan, supra note 48, at 102 (noting that privatization peaked in
1997 and thereafter began to decline); Davis, supra note 3, at 175 (noting both that the
“cancellation of high-profile concession agreements . . . has helped galvanize civic and
advocacy groups opposed to privatization” and that several global firms have “reevaluated
their involvement” in light of “political and financial risk”).
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the growing involvement of private entrepreneurs in water supply. The
rise of small-scale private suppliers, often with the tacit approval of local
officials, has been of far greater importance to most urban and
agricultural water users in developing nations. Using carts, bicycles,
poles, or trucks, small private entrepreneurs supply water to a
substantial proportion of the one billion people around the world who
61
lack access to improved water supplies. Indeed, by one estimate, small
private entrepeneurs supply water to anywhere from one-quarter to
62
one-half of all urban residents of Latin America and Africa. In many
urban areas, households with direct access to public water systems also
sell water to their neighbors, often through rudimentary piping systems
that constitute informal extensions of the public-supply infrastructure.
Recognizing the value of these informal water markets, some city
63
administrators are now looking at how to promote them.
Similar small-scale markets have also arisen in agricultural regions.
In parts of Asia, for example, farmers are highly dependent on
64
groundwater to irrigate their crops. Declines in groundwater tables,
however, have made it prohibitively expensive for poorer farmers to
drill and operate wells. Many farmers with wells have responded by
selling a portion of their groundwater to farmers who lack direct access
of their own. Significant “tubewell markets” now exist in China, India,
65
and Pakistan. In northern China, 44% of farming villages have active
66
tubewell markets (up from only 9% as recently as 1995). More than
70% of tubewell owners, moreover, sell at least some groundwater
67
through these markets.
On the other side of the supply–demand
equation, approximately 20% of households in the region depend on

61. Davis, supra note 3, at 150.
62. Id. (citing Tova Maria Solo, Small-Scale Entrepreneurs in the Urban Water and
Sanitation Market, 11 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 117, 118 n.1 (1999)).
63. STANFORD UNIV., WOODS INST. FOR THE ENV’T, PROGRAM ON WATER, HEALTH
AND DEVELOPMENT: PROMOTING SAFE, SUSTAINABLE WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5, 9, 11–13 (2010), available at http://woods.stanford.edu/ideas
/water-and-development/water-and-development.pdf (describing activities in Mozambique).
64. Tushaar Shah, The Groundwater Economy of South Asia: An Assessment of Size,
Significance and Socio-ecological Impacts, in THE AGRICULTURAL GROUNDWATER
REVOLUTION: OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS TO DEVELOPMENT 7, 7 (Mark Giordano &
Karen G. Villholth eds., 2007).
65. See, e.g., Lijuan Zhang et al., Development of Groundwater Markets in China: A
Glimpse into Progress to Date, 36 WORLD DEV. 706, 709 (2008).
66. Id. at 709–10 & tbl.1.
67. Id. at 720.
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68

4. Summary
While many parts of the world continue to reject the Dublin
Statement’s view that water should be viewed as an “economic good,”
the theme has attracted a substantial number of adherents over the last
quarter century. More importantly, it has led to significant practical
change in the provision and management of water. Water is now subject
to economic pricing, markets, and private provision in many parts of the
world—eroding the old perspective of water as a common good.
C. Water as a Human Right
The most recent and least developed view of water is water as a
69
human right. Interestingly, water was not included in early lists of
human rights. Over the last thirty years, however, access to an adequate
supply of safe water for personal and domestic use has slowly emerged
as a fundamental human right, although many developed nations,
including the United States, continue to oppose the concept.
Lacking any direct support for a human right to water in
international law, proponents of the right initially argued that the right
to water was implicit within various other recognized rights, reasoning
that access to water was necessary to effectuate those rights. For
example, in the latter half of the twentieth century, various
commentators and international institutions linked a right to water to
the rights to life and health found in the International Bill of Human
70
Rights.
The right to water elsewhere was associated by rights
recognized by the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
71
Cultural Rights, including rights to adequate housing and food.
The right to water for personal and domestic use has picked up
significant independent support in the twenty-first century. In 2002, for
example, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Cultural, and
Social Rights formally recognized access to water for basic domestic
needs as an independent human right—although the committee

68. Id. at 718.
69. For general analyses of water as a human right, see both Bluemel, supra note 4, and
Gleick, supra note 4.
70. See, e.g., Bluemel, supra note 4, at 968; Gleick, supra note 4, at 488.
71. See, e.g., Bluemel, supra note 4, at 969–70 (noting that all are three rights are
fundamental to an adequate standard of living).
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continued to justify the right as essential to meet other human rights.72
According to the U.N. Committee, “The human right to water entitles
everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible, and
73
affordable water for personal and domestic use[s].” At approximately
the same time, the International Law Association concluded that “every
person has a right . . . of access to water adequate to meet that person’s
74
In 2005, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the
vital human needs.”
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights declared that the right to
adequate water is both a separate human right and a corollary of other
75
human rights.
The drive to recognize a human right to water recently culminated in
an explicit declaration of the United Nations General Assembly, which
concluded that “clean drinking water . . . [is] integral to the realization
76
of all human rights” and “essential for the full enjoyment of life.” The
resolution also called on all nations to help meet this human right by
providing financial resources, building capacity, and transferring needed
77
technology to developing countries. One hundred twenty-two nations,
including most members of the European Union, voted in favor of the
78
However, forty-one
assembly declaration, and none voted against.
72. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶¶ 1–
3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003).
73. Id.
74. Two years later, the International Law Association concluded that “[e]very
individual has a right of access to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible, and
affordable water to meet that individual’s vital human needs.” Int’l Law Ass’n, Berlin Rules
of Water Resources art. 17, § 1, in 71 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 337, 365 (2004).
75. Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on
Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Economic, Social & Cultural Rights: Promotion of the
Realization of the Right to Drinking Water and Sanitation, pmbl., § 1, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/25
(July 11, 2005) (by El Hadji Guissé).
76. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES.64/292 (July 28, 2010); Press Release, Gen. Assem., General Assembly Adopts
Resolution Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as Human Right, By Recorded
Vote of 122 in Favor, None Against, 41 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release GA/10967 (July 28,
2010).
77. Press Release, supra note 76.
78. Id.; see also Peter H. Gleick, The Human Right to Water (and Sanitation),
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-h-gleick/the-humanright-to-water_b_671175.html; Mark Leon Goldberg, Why the United States Did Not Support
“Water as a Human Right” Resolution, UN DISPATCH (July 28, 2010),
http://www.undispatch.com/why-the-united-states-did-not-support-water-as-a-human-rightresolution; General Assembly Declares Access to Clean Water and Sanitation Is a Human
Right, UN NEWS CENTRE (July 28, 2010), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
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countries, including the United States, Australia, Canada, and the
79
United Kingdom, abstained. While only abstaining, the United States
publicly declared its view that there is no human right to water as a
80
matter of international law.
The constitutions of a small but growing number of countries also
81
recognize a right to water for personal and domestic use. In a handful
82
of cases, the right is explicit in the constitution. For example, South
Africa’s 1996 Bill of Rights explicitly provides that everyone enjoys the
“right to have access to . . . sufficient . . . water,” and provides that the
government must take “reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization” of
83
In other cases, courts or governmental agencies have
the right.
concluded that other rights within their constitutions implicitly embody
a right to water. For example, India’s courts have concluded that its
constitutional right to life includes the right to clean and sufficient
84
water.
Like water as a commodity, the view that water is a human right
remains highly contested. As noted, approximately 20% of all the
countries who are members of the United Nations voted to abstain from
the recent declaration of water as a human right. Except in a few
countries such as South Africa, there has been far more discussion of
why water should be a human right than action taken to actually supply
the poorer residents of developing nations with an adequate and clean
supply of water for personal and domestic use. Indeed, because the
35456&Cr=SANITATION&Cr1=.
79. See Gleick, supra note 78; Goldberg, supra note 78 (identifying the United States as
one of the abstaining countries).
80. Explanation of Vote by John F. Sammis, U.S. Deputy Rep. to the Econ. & Social
Council, on Resolution 1/64/L.63/Rev.1, the Human Right to Water (July 28, 2010),
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/145279.htm (by John F. Sammis).
81. See generally Bluemel, supra note 4, at 977–85 (most notably, South Africa, India,
and Argentina).
82. In addition to the discussion of South Africa’s constitutional provision in the text,
see CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA art. XIV, § (b) (“[A]ll Ugandans enjoy rights and
opportunities and access to . . . clean and safe water . . . .”).
83. S. AFR. CONST. § 27(1)–(2), 1996; see also The Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v.
Grootboom 2000 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 49 F (S. Afr.). In 1998, the South African government,
through its National Water Act, provided for the implementation of the affirmative duty to
provide water. National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 5(1), (3). For a general discussion of the
South African right to water, see Takacs, supra note 13, at 740–47.
84. See, e.g., Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, 10 S.C.C. 664, 767 (2000)
(India) (water is part of right to life under article 21 of the Indian Constitution); Attakoya
Thangal v. Union of India, 1990 (1) Ker L.T. 580 (India).
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concept of water as a human right is so new, there is still significant
uncertainty as to what it means and requires, both within countries and
internationally. The view that water is a human right, nonetheless, has
picked up considerable support over the last quarter century and has
provided forensic support to individuals and nongovernmental
organizations arguing for policies designed to provide adequate and
clean water access for the poor.
III. TENSIONS AND HARMONIZATION
Looked at individually, the ascendancy of the themes discussed in
Part I is not surprising. Each theme responds to a particular set of needs
and parallels general thematic trends elsewhere in the field of the
environment and natural resources. The theme of water as a public
trust responds to growing environmental concerns over the world’s
aquatic ecosystems and parallels the new global emphasis on
environmental sustainability. Water as a commodity responds to the
growing recognition that water is too scarce to waste and parallels the
general interest in market solutions to environmental problems. Finally,
the emphasis on water as a human right responds to the devastating fact
that over one billion people in the world still do not have access to
adequate and clean freshwater, and it forms one part of a growing global
focus on human rights.
What may seem surprising is that all three themes have become
more influential at the same time. As discussed below, the themes are
frequently seen as conflicting. Water as a commodity, in particular, is
often viewed as inconsistent with and even undermining the themes of
water as a public trust and a human right. An open question, therefore,
is whether the three themes will continue to grow in tandem, or whether
one or more of the visions will win out over the others.
A. Perceived Conflicts
1. Public Trust Versus Human Right
Of the three themes, “water as a public trust” and “water as a human
right” would seem the most reconcilable. If the government holds water
in trust for the overall public, ensuring adequate and safe water for
personal and domestic needs should arguably be at the top of the list of
trust purposes. And citizens without adequate access might legitimately
urge that the nation has failed to meet its trust responsibilities.
Interestingly, public trust cases have never addressed this issue. As
noted in Part II.A, public trust cases in the United States historically
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focused on non-consumptive uses of water (e.g., navigation, commerce,
and fishing) and, more recently, have turned to environmental
85
protection. Given the particular freshwater concerns at the relevant
points of time in U.S. history, these emphases might not be surprising, as
there has never been a major human-rights focus on water issues in the
United States. Yet public trust cases in developing nations, all of which
have been of recent vintage, also have focused primarily on
86
environmental concerns.
Commentators have begun to see the potential connections between
water as a public trust and water as a human right. Thus, a recent paper
commissioned by the IUCN Environmental Law Programme discusses
the public trust doctrine in connection with the potential use of
87
customary international law to enforce a human right to water. Even
here, however, the paper uses the public trust doctrine as an example of
the power of customary legal doctrines, and it never expressly suggests
that the public trust doctrine requires universal access to adequate and
88
clean water.
In theory, the emphasis in modern public trust cases on
environmental protection could conflict with the growing emphasis on a
human right to water. The potential for conflict depends on how
broadly a human right is defined. For example, could a human right
require governments to import and provide water to growing urban
populations in water-scarce regions, to the detriment of instream flows
or other parts of the environment, rather than permit them to deter
additional growth by refusing to provide new water supplies? A
governmental policy that considers water availability in planning land
uses and that discourages urban growth in areas with already-scarce
water supplies would seem consistent with both public trust and humanright themes. Indeed, such a policy might prove more effective in
meeting a human right to water than trying to find the domestic or
international resources necessary to provide needed urban
infrastructure. However, the vast majority of urbanization in the
developing world is unplanned, leaving open the question of whether a
nation could try to discourage new urban growth by announcing that it
85. See supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1996) Supp. 10 S.C.R. 12 (India); Waweru v.
The Republic, (2006) 1 K.L.R. 677, 687–88 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
87. John Scanlon et al., Water as Human Right? 9–10 (IUCN Envtl. Pol’y & L. Paper No.
51, 2004).
88. Id.

THOMPSON-13.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

36

11/21/2011 11:00 AM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[95:17

will not furnish water to unauthorized urban slums. While such a policy
might be consistent with treating water as a public trust, it could be
arguably inconsistent with a broadly defined human right to access.
Opponents of environmental protection have occasionally invoked a
broad claim of human rights to justify harmful water withdrawals.
Governmental efforts to protect California’s San Joaquin–Sacramento
Delta provide a recent example. Federal agencies and courts have
limited exports of water from the Delta to protect endangered and
threatened fish species, including Delta smelt and winter-run Chinook
89
salmon. The San Joaquin Valley agricultural community, which has
received less irrigation water as a result, has argued that the human
90
need for food and jobs should trump these environmental concerns.
Drawing on a broad vision of the human right to water that emphasizes
the importance of water not only to personal and domestic needs, but
also for the production of an adequate food supply to feed the world’s
burgeoning population and for jobs, opponents of Delta restrictions
have attempted to shape the dispute as a battle between the
91
environment and human rights.
2. Conflicts Stemming from Treating Water as a Commodity
Despite occasional concerns about potential conflicts between
treating water as a public trust and recognizing a broad human right to
water, the major concern raised by commentators has been the
possibility of conflicts with these two visions if water is treated as a
92
commodity. This is not surprising. As discussed in Part II, many
traditional water rules and policies, driven in large part by views
consistent with the public trust vision of water, seem inconsistent with
the commoditization of water. Efforts to price water at its full price,
promote water markets, and privatize the public supply of water often
seem to clash with ethical precepts underlying the public trust doctrine.
Consider, for example, privatization. The Supreme Court’s 1892
89. For overviews of the Delta controversy, see ELLEN HANAK ET AL., MANAGING
CALIFORNIA’S WATER: FROM CONFLICT TO RECONCILIATION 59–65 (2011); LEGAL
CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra note 32, at 628–39.
90. See, e.g., Katie Paul, Dying on the Vine, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 23, 2009),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/23/dying-on-the-vine.html.
91. See Malia Wollan, Hundreds Protest Cuts in Water in California, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 2009, at A17.
92. See, e.g., Corporate Water Privatization: Water is a Human Right, Not a Commodity,
SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/committees/cac/water/human_right/ (last visited
Oct. 8, 2011) [hereinafter SIERRA CLUB].
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opinion in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the progenitor of the
modern trust doctrine in the United States, appeared explicitly to
conclude that the privatization of a public trust resource is inconsistent
94
with the government’s public trust responsibilities. In Illinois Central,
the issue was whether the government could turn the harbor of a major
95
city over to a private railroad company to manage and develop.
Concluding that such a transfer was either void or voidable under the
public trust doctrine (even though the railroad agreed to protect and
promote navigation), Justice Stephen Field noted, “The State can no
more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave
them entirely under the use and control of private parties . . . than it can
96
abdicate its police powers.” If the government cannot turn a harbor
over to a private company, how can it privatize an entire urban water
system? If anything, the public interests in public control are arguably
greater in the case of water supplies than in navigation. As discussed in
Part II.B.3, concerns over the ability of profit-maximizing companies to
protect water quality and invest in adequate infrastructure led most
cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to replace
private water suppliers with municipal water agencies.
Or consider water marketing. As noted earlier, most governments,
including many states and territorial governments in the nineteenth
century American West, explicitly prohibited water transfers for reasons
that parallel elements of the vision of water as a public trust. One of the
most influential opponents of water transfers was Elwood Mead,
Wyoming’s state engineer and a key leader in the development of the
prior-appropriation system of water rights. In Mead’s view, water
markets were inconsistent with the view that water was a public
resource with ownership held by the government for the ultimate
benefit of all citizens:
If water is to be so bartered and sold, then the public should not
give streams away, but should auction them off to the highest
bidder.
....

93.
94.
95.
96.

146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Id. at 452–53.
Id. at 433–34.
Id. at 453.
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In monarchies streams belong to the crown, and in the early
history of irrigation in Italy and other parts of Europe, favorites
of the rulers were rewarded with grants of streams. But in a
republic they belong to the people, and ought forever to be kept
as public property for the benefit of all who use them, and for
them alone, such use to be under public supervision and
97
control.
Apparent conflicts between water commoditization and the other
two ascendant water themes continue today. One of the reasons that
human-rights advocates have pushed strongly in recent years for the
explicit recognition of a human right to water has been to help fight
98
The advocates fear that privatized
against efforts at privatization.
water companies will make it more difficult for the poor to obtain water
directly from urban systems. Part of the reason is that privatization of
urban water supplies almost always has been accompanied, often at the
explicit request of the contracting government, by increased collection
99
of water bills and higher water rates. Empirical studies have confirmed
that privatization virtually always leads to increases in monthly water
100
fees. Part of the reason is also the belief that profit-maximizing water
companies will inevitably favor the richer communities of a city and
101
neglect poorer areas because of the differences in potential profits.
Advocates for the urban poor have been successful in disrupting
privatization plans through the assertion of human rights. The
demonstrations and general strike that followed Bolivia’s efforts to
privatize the water system of Cochabamba provides the best-known
example. Rate increases that followed the takeover of the water system
by Bechtel Corporation, along with other actions, led to substantial and
102
ultimately successful opposition.
The resulting Cochabamba

97. MEAD, supra note 36, at 264, 365–66.
98. See, e.g., Bluemel, supra note 4, at 963 (“Calls for recognition of a human right to
water have largely resulted from a mistrust and fear of treating water as an economic good.”).
99. Davis, supra note 3, at 165–67.
100. Id. at 166.
101. Id. at 170 (“A private firm will understandably be more interested in extending
services to those areas where effective demand for improved services is highest and where the
cost of service provision is lowest—both characteristics which typically apply to higherincome neighborhoods.”).
102. For an overview of the Cochabamba conflict, see Bluemel, supra note 4, at 965–67.
For a more in-depth analysis, see generally OSCAR OLIVERA, ¡COCHABAMBA! WATER WAR
IN BOLIVIA (2004).
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Declaration provides one of the clearest statements of the perceived
inconsistency of commoditization with the treatment of water as a public
trust and human right:
For the right to life, for the respect of nature and the uses
and traditions of our ancestors and our peoples, for all time the
following shall be declared as inviolable rights with regard to the
uses of water given us by the earth:
1. Water belongs to the earth and all species and is sacred to
life, therefore, the world’s water must be conserved, reclaimed,
and protected for all future generations and its natural patterns
respected.
2. Water is a fundamental human right and a public trust to
be guarded by all levels of government, therefore, it should not be
commodified, privatized, or traded for commercial purposes.
These rights must be enshrined at all levels of government. In
particular, an international treaty must ensure these principles
are incontrovertible.
3. Water is best protected by local communities and citizens
who must be respected as equal partners with governments in
the protection and regulation of water. Peoples of the earth are
103
the only vehicle to promote earth democracy and save water.
Subsequent to the Cochabamba Declaration, opponents of
privatization have used the theme of human rights, as well as the public
trust doctrine, to kill proposed private concessions in such high-profile
cities as Buenos Aires, Argentina; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Manila,
104
Philippines.
Environmentalists have enjoyed a more mixed relationship with the
commoditization of water. Some more market-oriented environmental
organizations, such as the Environmental Defense Fund, have pushed
for higher water prices and water markets as effective means of
increasing conservation and thus reducing stresses on natural water
105
systems.
Other environmental groups, by contrast, have worried

103. The Cochabamba Declaration, Dec. 8, 2000, reprinted in OLIVERA, supra note 102
(emphasis added).
104. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 59, at 2–7.
105. See, e.g., STAVINS, supra note 23, at v (highlighting an EDF study advocating the
use of water markets to relieve pressure on natural water systems).
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about the long-term potential impact that viewing water as a commodity
would have on environmental arguments based on the public trust
106
doctrine. Whether an environmental group sees a serious conflict has
depended in part on whether the group focuses on practical policy or
rhetorical impact.
B. The Case for Harmonization
The three themes need not conflict, but instead can work together to
provide a more complete and effective vision for water management.
Harmony results in part from recognizing that the themes play different
roles in shaping water management. Both the public trust doctrine and
the human right to water set goals for water management. In particular,
both emphasize that the goal of water management is not simply to
promote economic development. While not denying the importance of
using water for economic development, water managers must protect
the environment and other communal interests in waterways (such as
navigation and fish stocks)—this being the role of the public trust
doctrine—and they must ensure that all citizens have basic access to
water for personal and domestic use (the human right).
Commoditization of water, by contrast, provides a mechanism for
achieving these goals, as well as the separate goals of minimizing costs
and maximizing the economic value of other consumptive uses of water.
Viewed as a tool, commoditization can support rather than conflict with
both the public trust and a human right to water—if designed to
promote these goals and not simply overall societal wealth. Finally, the
public trust doctrine places an institutional side constraint on water
management by ensuring that the government can always reconfigure
water rights and policy in the interest of the general public—no matter
what private rights it has awarded. The public trust doctrine, in short,
restricts the extent of commoditization that can occur.
The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development,
discussed earlier, incorporates all three themes, seeing little if any
apparent conflict among them. As noted, the Dublin Statement
107
promoted recognizing water as an “economic good.”
In introducing
this principle, however, the Dublin Statement noted, “Within this
principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human beings
106. See, e.g., SIERRA CLUB, supra note 92 (objecting to view that water should be
treated as a commodity).
107. Dublin Statement, supra note 25, princ. 4.
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to have access to clean water . . . at an affordable price.”
More
importantly, the Dublin Statement emphasizes that water should be
treated as an economic good not as a goal in itself, but because of its
instrumental value. Failure to treat water as an economic good can lead
109
to “wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the resource.”
Managing it as an economic good is thus a particularly effective means
of encouraging conservation and “achieving efficient and equitable
110
use.” Getting into specifics of water management, the statement also
emphasizes that improved pricing of urban water supplies can help
encourage conservation, reduce system losses, and by financially
enabling recycling and reuse, hopefully free up water for both growing
111
urban regions and environmental needs.
1. Commoditization and the Public Trust
Governments can and do use markets to promote a number of
public trust goals, including environmental protection. Because the
environment is a public good, government intervention and regulation is
essential to its protection; private markets for environmental protection
will neither reflect intrinsic values of the environment nor, given
collective action problems, even fully reflect personal preferences for
112
environmental protection. However, the commoditization of water, by
increasing water efficiency, can reduce the pressure on existing
113
environmental flows and on groundwater aquifers.
Private water
markets, moreover, can both assist the government in achieving
environmental protection and permit individuals to contribute toward a
114
higher level of protection than the government provides.
Because protection of aquatic environments can require reductions
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Dublin Statement, supra note 25, The Action Agenda.
112. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Private
Role, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 255 (2001–2002) (noting that “philanthropic conservation” will
not reflect the full value of the conservation because (1) some people will be tempted to “free
ride” on the contributions of others, and (2) people will not have adequate information to
judge the value); see also JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 17–19 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining why public goods may
be underproduced).
113. See STAVINS, supra note 23 (explaining how water markets in Southern California
could help protect the environment).
114. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 261, 263–64 (2000) [hereinafter Markets for Nature].
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in water withdrawals, existing water users frequently oppose proposed
governmental protections. In recent years, governments in developed
nations have often turned to markets to achieve environmental
protection over such opposition. For example, in much of the western
United States, both the federal and state governments have purchased
water from willing sellers and then dedicated the water to instream
115
flow.
California also created an Environmental Water Account
(EWA) to purchase sufficient water to offset losses in water exports
when pumps in the state’s Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta had to be
116
shut down to save endangered fish.
Prior to the EWA, the
government repeatedly ran into political opposition when it tried to shut
down the pumps because this led to reduced exports; such opposition
led not only to legal disputes, but also to delays in the governmental
117
orders. The EWA reduced political tensions by purchasing sufficient
118
water to make whole the recipients of the exported water.
In the American West, a growing number of philanthropic “water
trusts” now supplement governmental protections of environmental
flows through market transactions. Much like how The Nature
Conservancy and other land trusts purchase real estate for conservation,
water trusts either lease or purchase water rights and then can dedicate
119
the water to instream flow. Beginning with the creation of the Oregon
Water Trust (now the Freshwater Trust) twenty years ago, water trusts
120
now exist in a majority of the western states. Land trusts, moreover,
are beginning to acquire water rights as part of their conservation
121
mission.
Recognizing the environmental value of such trusts, a
growing number of western states have passed laws authorizing
115. Id. at 267–70.
116. Id. at 308–10 (describing the EWA’s proposals and purposes prior to the EWA
being finalized). For more information on the EWA, see generally Alf W. Brandt, An
Environmental Water Account: The California Experience, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 426
(2002); and Larry R. Brown et al., Managing Water to Protect Fish: A Review of California’s
Environmental Water Account, 2001–2005, 43 ENVTL. MGMT. 357 (2009).
117. Markets for Nature, supra note 114, at 309–10 (noting the difficulty of increasing
flow requirements over opposition of existing users).
118. Id. at 308–10.
119. See Simon Hone et al., A Role for the Private Sector in the Provision of River and
Riparian Goods?, 30 ECON. PAPERS 157, 158 (2011); Markets for Nature, supra note 114, at
271, 286–87.
120. For a history of the first ten years of the Freshwater Trust, see Janet C. Neuman,
The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: The First Ten Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 83 NEB. L.
REV. 432 (2004).
121. Markets for Nature, supra note 114, at 271.
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environmental transfers and protecting the resulting flows.
In many parts of the world, privatization of water supply systems
also benefits environmental protection. Water suppliers are highly
fragmented throughout much of the world, including the United States
(due both to the way in which water systems historically developed and
to the desire of individual localities to each have their own water
systems). Municipality-specific suppliers are often too small to have the
123
expertise needed to comply with water quality regulations.
In many
developing regions, moreover, suppliers are insufficiently staffed for
environmental compliance. Privatization of water suppliers may be an
effective means to provide the needed expertise and revenue to improve
environmental performance. Indeed, privatization in a number of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
124
countries has led to greater compliance with environmental standards.
Experience with privatization to date raises doubts over Justice
Field’s suggestion in Illinois Central that turning a public trust resource
over to a private firm undermines the government’s public trust
125
responsibility.
As noted earlier, Justice Field equated privatization
with abdication of the government’s police power. Technically, of
course, that is not true. The government retains its police power over
natural resources no matter who owns them (although the takings
protections may limit the ability of the government to exercise its police
power without compensation in the United States). Private water
suppliers must meet environmental standards no less than public
suppliers. And as just noted, private suppliers may do a better job of
meeting environmental standards in some cases. Interestingly, studies
suggest that the better performance of private suppliers may be due not
only to stronger capabilities, but also to the fact that regulatory agencies
often appear to enforce standards more rigorously against private firms
126
than against fellow governmental agencies. In short, the public trust
122. See id. at 287.
123. See SAX ET AL., supra note 32, at 716. The abilities of private suppliers to meet
environmental standards and maintain up-to-date technology are reasons that cities have
investigated privatization. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Privatization of Municipal Water
Suppliers, LOOKING AHEAD, June 1999, at 1, 4.
124. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 3, at 163 (“Case-based evidence in several OECD
countries suggests that privatization has helped utilities achieve compliance with water quality
and wastewater treatment standards.”). That does not mean, however, that private water
suppliers do not violate pollution standards. Id. at 164.
125. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
126. Davis, supra note 3, at 164.
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might actually benefit from separating the poacher from the
gamekeeper, rather than merging them through governmental control of
both the water supply system and the regulatory regime.
2. Commoditization and Human Rights
Treating water as a commodity also can help implement a human
127
Although the populations of some cities have
right to water.
outstripped their available water supplies, the major problem in
ensuring everyone a clean and adequate supply of freshwater in most of
128
the world is access rather than total supply. Many parts of the world
do not have the financial capital or the political commitment to supply
129
Lacking an
water to all residents through public-supply systems.
improved public supply, people must obtain water themselves either
from local waterways or aquifers, yet many do not have the money or
other resources needed to do so.
Full-cost pricing of urban water supplies can help address both the
adequacy of the water supplies and lack of access. By encouraging
conservation, full-cost pricing can help stretch available supplies among
a larger population. Full-cost pricing also can provide additional
revenue for expansion of infrastructure. And full-cost pricing does not
necessarily prevent access by the poor. For example, tiered pricing
systems, under which small users receive water for free or for a
“lifeline” price but water rates rise as overall consumption increases, can
ensure water for the poor while confronting larger water users with the
130
full marginal cost of their water. Cities also can charge all users the
full cost of their water, but provide poor consumers with an offsetting
lump-sum subsidy.
As noted in Part II, small-scale water markets are also helping to
provide water access to urban and rural residents in large areas of the
world. Consider, for example, the groundwater markets in parts of
Asia. A recent study of the groundwater markets by economists with
the Chinese Academy of Sciences found that the markets provided
water access to poor farmers who otherwise would have lacked feasible
127. See Budds & McGranahan, supra note 48, at 95 (“There is no inherent conceptual
contradiction between private sector participation and the achievement of human rights, but
contradictions will arise in particular circumstances.”).
128. See Davis, supra note 3, at 165, 169.
129. Id. at 154–56.
130. For a recent discussion on tiered pricing in the water field, see HANAK ET AL.,
supra note 89, at 270–72.
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water supplies—markets were of the greatest importance to farmers
131
who were small, less educated, and older. By bridging the access gap,
the water markets also reduced income gaps among the farmers.
Despite fears that water markets might lead to price gouging, the
groundwater markets in Asia were very competitive—with low profit
132
margins—so the benefits went largely to the water purchasers. Studies
of small-scale water suppliers in areas such as Africa also suggest that
water markets can aid the poor by providing reliable water delivery and
133
flexible financial arrangements, such as short-term credit.
Large-scale privatization of urban water supply systems also can
increase population coverage (as well as the quality of the water supply,
as discussed earlier). Many countries have turned to privatization
because of the greater access to international capital markets that many
134
large private water suppliers enjoy.
Empirical studies suggest that
privatization has often led to accelerated capital investment in
infrastructure expansion, although the levels of investment have
sometimes fallen short of the target increases agreed to by the supplier
135
as part of the privatization agreement.
Privatization does not guarantee solutions and, if poorly managed,
can actually undermine access for the poorest members of society.
Whether privatization improves access depends in part on how a city
structures the bidding for the right to run the municipal water supply
system and on the terms of the contract. For example, cities often
choose a company based on the payments that each company promises
to make to the city in exchange for the privilege to run its water supply
system. Such a competition encourages companies to look for ways to
minimize costs so that it can make larger governmental payments,
undermining company incentive to reinvest in infrastructure
enlargement. By contrast, La Paz–El Alto, Bolivia, set basic pricing
terms and then asked each company to bid based on how much it would
expand water access to local residents. As a result, La Paz–El Alto saw
a significant increase in access through its privatization of the local
136
water supply.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Zhang et al., supra note 65, at 718.
Id. at 718–20.
Davis, supra note 3, at 150–51.
See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
Davis, supra note 3, at 162.
Id. at 170.
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IV. WATER AS A PUBLIC COMMODITY
As discussed in Part III, all three visions for water—water as a public
trust, as a human right, and as a commodity—are potentially
harmonious. Tensions exist among the visions, particularly in the
assumptions and perspectives often underlying them, but a welldesigned water regime should be able to reduce and manage these
tensions. Not only are the three visions reconcilable, but a water regime
that lacks any one of the visions would be either impoverished or
ultimately less effective. The public trust doctrine recognizes the critical
public goods provided by freshwater resources and the need for
government to protect and promote such goods. A human right to
water reflects the indispensable role of water in human life and personal
development. Normative obligations to current and future generations,
as well as to nature, animate both visions. However, unless water is
treated also as a commodity, water regimes will find it more difficult to
achieve either goal. Water use for agriculture and industry, which
makes up the vast majority of water use throughout the world, will also
be suboptimal, undermining economic development and reducing GDP.
A vision of water as a public commodity combines all three themes,
integrating them rather than pitting them against each other.
Importantly, the vision starts by recognizing the “publicness” of water:
its critical roles in advancing life, culture, and religion, and supporting
ecosystems. But the vision goes on to recognize the importance of
treating water as a commodity, both in fulfilling the public values of
water and in maximizing domestic wealth and income. In this vision, the
publicness of water acts both to determine a partial set of the goals of
market mechanisms (and thus to shape the laws underlying the market
mechanisms) and to limit the markets.
The water regimes of two developing countries—South Africa and
Chile—have experimented with the vision of water as a public
commodity. The main purpose of South Africa’s post-apartheid water
law has been to correct former injustices in the allocation of water and
137
other resources and to protect the interests of the poor.
As noted
137. See Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 12. For useful analyses of South Africa’s water
system, including its integration of the multiple visions set out earlier in this Article, see
generally ROGER BATE & RICHARD TREN, THE COST OF FREE WATER: THE GLOBAL
PROBLEM OF WATER MISALLOCATION AND THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA (2002); and
Rashid Hassan & Jackie Crafford, Environmental and Economic Accounts for Water in South
Africa, in THE ECONOMICS OF WATER MANAGEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING APPROACH 114 (Glenn-Marie Lange & Rashid Hassan
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earlier, the South Africa Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees everyone a
right of “access to . . . sufficient . . . water” and provides for the
138
“progressive realisation of [this] right[].”
South Africa’s National
Water Act of 1998 furthers this guarantee, setting out goals of “meeting
the basic human needs of present and future generations” and
139
“promoting equitable access to water.” And the country’s Free Basic
Water Policy “guarantee[s] each person a minimum basic quantity of
140
potable water.”
South Africa also explicitly adopts a vision of water as a public trust,
situating the national government as the trustee of the nation’s water
supplies and calling for water to be used to promote the public interest,
141
sustainability, equity, and efficiency.
Starting with its 1996
Constitution, South Africa has emphasized environmental protection as
142
a matter of both human health and well-being.
In support of these
goals, South African law abolishes private ownership of water and
recognizes ecological water reserves to be used for basic human and
143
environmental needs.
Yet, within the scope of these goals, South Africa has recognized a
role for treating water as a commodity. While unrestricted water
markets might challenge the nation’s equity goals, limited markets
within the agricultural sector can increase efficiency without
undermining the visions of water as either a human right or a public
144
trust.
Therefore, as noted earlier, South Africa has established
rudimentary water markets, resulting in some local increases in
145
efficiency. Water markets exist in various areas, including the Lower
eds., 2006).
138. S. AFR. CONST. § 27(1)(a), (2), 1996.
139. See Rose Francis, Water Justice in South Africa: Natural Resources Policy at the
Intersection of Human Rights, Economics, and Political Power, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
149, 161–66 (2005); Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 26.
140. Francis, supra note 139, at 178.
141. William L. Andreen, Water Law and the Search for Sustainability: A Comparative
Analysis, in WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 155, 162 (R. Quentin
Grafton & Karen Hussey eds., 2011); Robyn Stein, Water Law in a Democratic South Africa:
A Country Case Study Examining the Introduction of a Public Rights System, 83 TEX. L. REV.
2167, 2174–76 (2005).
142. See S. AFR. CONST. § 24(a), 1996 (“Everyone has the right to an environment that
is not harmful to their health or well-being.”).
143. Andreen, supra note 141, at 162–63; Francis, supra note 139, at 161–63; Grafton et
al., supra note 27, at 33; Stein, supra note 141, at 2181–83.
144. See Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 22.
145. See id. at 17, 19 (noting limited water transfers in South Africa).
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Orange River, the Crocodile River, and the Nkwaleni Valley. Further,
in one of its most controversial policies, South Africa emphasizes the
importance of full-cost recovery in water management and distribution,
147
reversing a history of subsidizing water provisions.
A diverse set of public and private-sector entities also currently work
to deliver domestic water, including the basic water supply guaranteed
148
to all residents by the Bill of Rights. According to the South African
government, the water challenges facing the country are “simply too big
to be addressed by government alone,” leaving an important role for
149
private entities to play. In particular, South Africa was faced with a
large backlog of infrastructure needs when the African National
Congress took power in 1994, a challenge which the government felt
150
private markets might be able to help address. Privatization, to date,
has occurred in such diverse areas as the Dolphin Coast (where the
151
water concession requires the provision of free basic water), Nelspruit
(which has seen an increase in the number of customers at the same
time that the water supplier has reduced the total amount of water
146. See id. at 17, 19; W.L. Nieuwoudt & R.M. Armitage, Water Market Transfers in
South Africa: Two Case Studies, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. W09S05, ¶¶ 2, 32–33 (2004).
147. THE DEP’T OF WATER AFFAIRS, WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL WATER POLICY
FOR SOUTH AFRICA 5 (1997), available at http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/nwpw
p.pdf; Reynaud Daniels, Implementation of the Right of Access to Sufficient Water Through
Privatization in South Africa, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 61, 65 (2006); Francis, supra note
139, at 161, 165, 170–76. These provisions of South Africa’s water policy have not always
meshed well with the concept of water as a human right. Thus, in some situations, the policy
has led to substantial debt among the poor and, of most concern, the cutting off of water
supplies despite laws designed to protect low-income consumers and reduce potential
impacts. Francis, supra, at 170–74.
148. See S. AFR. CONST. § 27(1)(b), 1996; Davis, supra note 3, at 152 (citing Mike
Muller, Public–Private Partnerships in Water: A South African Perspective on the Global
Debate, 15 J. INT’L DEV. 1115, 1116–20 (2003)). See generally Daniels, supra note 147 (noting
the legislative framework in the South African context); Afeikhena Jerome, Private Sector
Participation in Infrastructure in Africa, in GLOBALISATION, INSTITUTIONS AND AFRICAN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE
2008, at 273 (2010) (detailing the trends of participation in infrastructure and development in
Africa).
149. Francis, supra note 139, at 176 (quoting DEP’T OF WATER AFFAIRS & FORESTRY,
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR WATER SERVICES, WATER IS LIFE, SANITATION IS DIGNITY
§ 3.4.7 (2003)).
150. See Daniels, supra note 147, at 65.
151. See South Africa: Borough of Dolphin Coast, in 2 CASE STUDIES OF BANKABLE
WATER AND SEWERAGE UTILITIES: COMPENDIUM OF CASE STUDIES 3, 3–12 (USAID ed.,
2005), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADE148.pdf. According to the USAID,
service provision under the concession is reliable, and the utility is covering all of its costs and
retaining funds for infrastructure investment. Id. at 10.
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needed to supply its customers), and Johannesburg. South African
law requires municipalities to regulate all private providers, including
controlling tariffs and avoiding interruptions in service; and
municipalities remain ultimately responsible for meeting constitutional
154
obligations. Privatization has had a mixed record but appears to have
worked well in those instances where careful attention has been given to
the structuring of the contract and incentives.
Chile has also tried integrating multiple themes into its water
155
system. Since the 1980s, Chile has promoted the use of free markets
156
and water transfers to allocate water resources.
Indeed, Chile is the
only country to explicitly recognize and protect private rights to water in
its constitution. Water markets have taken significant hold in some
157
regions of the country.
According to economic studies, Chile’s
commoditization of water has significantly contributed to the GDP of
these regions by allowing water to move from low-value to higher-value
158
economic uses and by encouraging conservation.
For example, one
152. See Daniels, supra note 147, at 83–85 (noting also various problems that have arisen
over time in connection with the concession); Francis, supra note 139, at 177
153. Francis, supra note 139, at 177.
154. Daniels, supra note 147, at 69–71.
155. For overviews of Chile’s water system, and in particular its use of markets, see
generally CARL J. BAUER, SIREN SONG: CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR
INTERNATIONAL REFORM (2004); Carl J. Bauer, Slippery Property Rights: Multiple Water
Uses and the Neoliberal Model in Chile, 1981–1995, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 109 (1998);
Stephen E. Draper, The Unintended Consequences of Tradable Property Rights to Water, 20
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 49, 54–55 (2005); Brendan McNallen, Fixing the Leaks in Brazil’s
Water Law: Encouraging Sound Private Sector Participation Through Legal and Regulatory
Reform, 9 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 147, 159–64 (2006); Monica Ríos Brehm & Jorge Quiroz, The
Market for Water Rights in Chile (World Bank Technical Paper No. 285, 1995).
156. For general descriptions, see Bjornlund & McKay, supra note 44, at 774–76; Brehm
& Quiroz, supra note 155, at 1.
157. Bjornlund & McKay, supra note 44, at 775. Other parts of the country have not
seen a similar growth in water transfers. A variety of factors appear to have limited the
growth of water markets in these other regions, including a rigid system of water distribution,
legal uncertainty over water title, the availability of other options to obtain water, and
conflicting social values. Id. at 776. Some observers also report that water-right holders have
tended to “hoard their rights as a kind of insurance policy to guard against future droughts or
to await higher prices, and, in some cases, to block competitors from entering the market.”
Andreen, supra note 141, at 161.
158. The emphasis on increased efficiency has had a distributional impact, with the
power sector crowding out a significant number of farmers. See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo,
Chilean Town Withers in Free Market for Water, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A12 (noting
competition with mining companies). Analysts have differed on the success of Chile’s water
markets. According to one 1995 study, Chile’s water market “has worked reasonably well,
especially in zones where water scarcity problems are more acute” and, in some situations,
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recent study concluded that the benefits from water markets in Chile
“are substantial and amount to between 8[%] and 32[%] of agricultural
159
contribution to regional GDP, or some $22 million annually.”
Chile also has been one of four South American countries to actively
160
engage in privatization of municipal water supply systems. Moreover,
according to many observers, Chile’s privatization efforts have been
highly successful, in large part because of active national efforts to
regulate the water provision of private suppliers, carefully monitor the
bidding process and contractual performance, and rationalize water
161
tariffs. Privatization has led to increased investments in infrastructure,
162
improved performance, and greater conservation.
Chile has tempered this commoditization with recognition of the
importance of water to all members of its population, including the
poor. Consequently, Chile has adopted laws and policies to ensure
water access by poor farmers and urban users; among these are subsidies
to help 13% of the nation’s families obtain a minimum quantity of
163
potable water at an affordable price.
Chile, however, has not done as well in promoting the public trust
interest in water, particularly for environmental protection. At a
rudimentary level, Chile’s water laws appear to support the view of
water as a public trust; thus, its 1981 Water Code specifically provides
164
that “water is a natural resource for public use.” But Chile has done
“has helped to avoid expensive new water infrastructure by allowing frictionless transfers of
water rights from agricultural to urban sectors.” Brehm & Quiroz, supra note 155, at 28. For
a far more skeptical view, see Andreen, supra note 141, at 161 (concluding that Chile’s
“radical free market approach failed”).
159. Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 18 (citing Ereney Hadjigeorgalis & Jay Lillywhite,
The Impact of Institutional Constraints on the Limarí River Valley Water Market, 40 WATER
RESOURCES RES. W05501, ¶¶ 63–66 (2004)); see also Brehm & Quiroz, supra note 155, at 6–7
(estimating the economic gains from water markets).
160. See McNallen, supra note 155, at 159. The other three countries are Argentina,
Bolivia, and Brazil. Id.
161. Id. at 159–64. In the early 2000s, all thirteen of the regional water utilities in Chile
engaged in some type of privatization. Id. at 163.
162. See MARIA DE LA LUZ DOMPER, CHILE: A DYNAMIC WATER MARKET 4–5
(March 2009), available at http://www.policynetwork.net/sites/default/files/Chile_March09.
pdf.
163. Davis, supra note 3, at 169; see also McNallen, supra note 155, at 162–63 (explaining
the subsidy system for the poor). “In 2001, the scheme totaled 500,000 subsidies and cost
$20.1 million. Around 15% of households were covered by the scheme, receiving an average
subsidy of $10 monthly.” DE LA LUZ DOMPER, supra note 162, at 6.
164. See Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 8 (discussing the provisions of the 1981 Water
Code).
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little to translate this foundation into effective environmental
165
protection.
Water transfers, for example, are permitted without
166
The
adequate consideration of potential environmental impacts.
World Bank believes that, as a result, environmental externalities are
pervasive and likely to become an increasing problem in the future
167
unless addressed. Unlike South Africa, Chile has not fully integrated
the three themes into a balanced and effective vision.
Several lessons can be learned from the experiences of South Africa,
Chile, and other countries. First, there are tensions between the visions
of water as a public trust and a human right, on the one hand, and the
vision of water as a commodity, on the other. Markets, without
governmental intervention, will generally not protect the poor, promote
the environment, or advance other purely public interests in water
resources. The commodification of water can thus lead to greater water
inequality and to environmental degradation if adequate governmental
institutions do not exist to protect these other interests. When
privatizing water supplies or opening up water markets, governments
must both ensure that they have the expertise and resources to oversee
the process and provide for effective regulation of performance.
Second, the market is not a panacea in addressing water issues.
While water markets often increase water-use efficiency and help
allocate water to economically more valuable uses, water markets
generally face legal, economic, and cultural barriers that preclude them
from achieving all that they might. While privatization has increased
infrastructure investment, performance, and, in some contexts,
efficiency, it has been less successful in other settings and has sometimes
failed spectacularly. The difference between success and failure often
has depended on the existence of adequate rules and institutions to
oversee the awarding and implementation of contracts. Conversely, the
government has significant roles still to play, not only in promoting
public access to water and environmental protection, but also in
165. Id.
166. Andreen, supra note 141, at 161; Draper, supra note 155, at 55; see also Brehm &
Quiroz, supra note 155, at 25–27 (noting that Chile has had difficulties implementing water
policies that consider environmental impacts); Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 28 (noting that
the Water Code fails to address “third-party effects or environmental impacts”). Water
transfers also fail to adequately account for third-party impacts on other water-right holders.
Draper, supra note 155, at 55; Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 28.
167. Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 28 (citing John Briscoe et al., Managing Water as an
Economic Resource: Reflections on the Chilean Experience 11 (World Bank, Envtl. Econ. Ser.
No. 62, 1998)).
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encouraging greater efficiency.
Finally, despite these concerns, markets can play and have played a
critical role in improving water management, and a well-designed water
policy can harmonize the vision of water as a commodity with both of
the other two visions. Water markets, pricing, and privatization are all
tools that can not only promote greater economic efficiency in water
use, but, when properly designed, also help increase overall access to
fresh water in developing nations and increase overall environmental
protection. Water systems that ignore these tools are at a disadvantage
in promoting societal wealth and well-being. Rather than thinking of
water in terms of any one of the visions outlined in Part II, governments,
therefore, should think of water as a public commodity—a resource that
is inseparable from the public values that it can promote, but a resource
that is also a commodity and that should be recognized as such within
the confines of the public values.

